



Digital Forensics

MO447 / MC919

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Spoofing in Biometrics

Techniques for creation and detection

Outline

- ▶ Introduction
- ▶ Motivation
- ▶ General Vision
 - ▶ Fingerprints
 - ▶ Iris
 - ▶ Face
- ▶ Anti-spoof for fingerprints
- ▶ Anti-spoof for faces




Introduction



Introduction

- ▶ **Biometrics:** set of methods for identifying, automatically, an individual based on physical or behavioral traits
 - ▶ Fingerprint
 - ▶ Iris
 - ▶ Face



Biometric Systems




Fig. 1. An example of how biometric data travels to obtain a result.



Motivation




Motivation

- ▶ **Biometrics burst**
[Thalheim et al. 2002] fingerprints are more common, facial recognition and voice recognition more acceptable and reliable; signature and way of typing still catching up
- ▶ Several research for optimizing how to differentiate humans
- ▶ Unfortunately, until recently, few research on method's reliability and how to avoid attacks



Video Demo





General Vision

[Nixon et al. 2007]

Complemented with [Thalheim et al. 2002]



Attacks

- ▶ Objective: to hide one identity or to obtain privileges of someone else

- ▶ Types:

- ▶ Replay (sniffer in USB), Trojan (change the matcher or the DB)

- ▶ **Spoof**

- ▶ Consists of presenting to the sensor a fake biometric data

- ▶ More susceptible (everyone has access to this part of the system)

- ▶ Can be a fake gelatin/silicon finger with some else's fingerprint, a fake photo, or a contact lens

- ▶ The 1st attacks on a biometric system dates of 1920s, by Albert Wehde, then an inmate at a Kansas penitentiary. He used his experience in photography and engraving to forge latent prints.



Attacks

- ▶ Recently, it has been shown that soft material artificial fingers could be falsely accepted as real fingers on widely available biometric fingerprint sensors.
- ▶ This pioneering work prompted the development of a research area focused on probing sensor vulnerabilities and finding countermeasures to attacks.



Attacks

- ▶ When the goal of the spoof is to gain access that another person has, the first step is to retrieve the fingerprint of that person – i.e., a person that is already enrolled.
- ▶ There are two approaches to acquiring an enrolled subject's fingerprint: cooperative retrieval and non-cooperative retrieval.



Attacks

- ▶ In cooperative retrieval, the subject allows the collection of one or more fingerprints. The fingerprint is usually collected by pressing the finger in a small amount of suitable material such as wax or dental mold material;
- ▶ the impression creates a mold from which artificial fingers can be cast.
- ▶ A variety of materials have been used for casting such as silicone, moldable plastic, plaster, clay, and dental molding material.



Attacks

- ▶ In a real-world scenario, it is highly unlikely that a person would agree to produce a mold from a finger.
- ▶ For non-cooperative retrieval, the method devised by Albert Wehde is still in use: today, printed circuit board etching is a successful molding technique for producing “gummy” and other soft material artificial fingers




Spooofing Detection

- ▶ Check if a biometric sample really comes from a real person (live). It can consider:
 - ▶ Use the same data used for identification
 - ▶ Collect more data in time
 - ▶ Employ additional hardware



Biometric System



An example of how biometric data travels to obtain a result.



Fingerprints

“How To Fool a Fingerprint Security System As Easy As ABC”



© 2010 Instructables

**Make a fake fingerprint
to fool a security system**

Spoof Creation

▶ How does it work?

- ▶ Based on the position of details (*minutiae*), as terminations and bifurcations of the finger
10 to 12 are enough to uniquely identify a person

▶ Spoofs

▶ Latent fingerprints


- ▶ Graphite powder and adhesive tape – almost 100% efficacy
- ▶ Breath
doesn't work always
- ▶ Water bag
Highly accurate



© Thalheim et al.



SpooF Creation



Spoof Creation



- ▶ **More spoofs**

- ▶ **Artificial finger**

- ▶ **Obtaining a fingerprint of someone else's**

- in cooperation or using a photography of an enhanced/contrasted latent fingerprint

- ▶ **Mold it in a soft material**

- silicon, plastic, gelatin, wax, dental powder

- ▶ **Dismembered finger**



Fingerprint acquisition sensors

▶ **Optical**

- ▶ **Total internal reflection (TIR):** different reflection patterns in the ridges (contact with the glass) and ridges espaces (air).

▶ **Attacks**

- ▶ artificial fingers with similar skin reflectance material

- ▶ Latent fingerprints
[Thalheim et al. 2002] adesive tapes, graphite powder

- ▶ **Multispectral imaging (MSI):** More details in a bit




Fingerprint acquisition sensors

- ▶ **Ultrasound:** difference of acoustic speed waves for ridges and the air
 - ▶ **Attacks:**
 - ▶ gelatin artificial fingers (same skin properties with respect to echo)



Fingerprint acquisition sensors

- ▶ **Capacitive:** difference in capacitance for the ridges
 - ▶ **Attacks:**
 - ▶ Latent fingerprints [Thalheim et al. 2002] Easy!
 - ▶ Gelatin artificial fingers



- ▶ **Thermic:** temperature difference for ridges (contact with glass) and non-ridge areas (air).
 - ▶ **Attacks:**
 - ▶ Artificial gelatin or silicon fingers [Thalheim et al. 2002] Harder to spoof than optical and capacitive sensors



Detecting Fingerprint Spoof

- ▶ **Exudation/Sweating**
 - ▶ Temporal changes in the amount of sweat in the finger's surface
 - ▶ Several images across time
 - ▶ Optical and capacitive sensors
- ▶ **Skin absorption**
blood cells, hemoglobin, oxygen
- ▶ **Skin temperature**
A spoof can be put in a real finger but part of the temperature will be dissipated
- ▶ **Pulsation**
Varies from one person to another and according to the situation
- ▶ **Other possibilities**
Skin electrical resistance, ultrasound detection of dermic structures



Iris




Spoof Creation


- ▶ **How does it work**
 - ▶ Based on the textured region of the eye around the pupil
 - ▶ Uses infrared light
 - ▶ Creates templates through filter banks

© Thalheim et al.





<http://s3.amazonaws.com/>



Attacks

▶ Spoofs

▶ High res photo or video of an eye

[Thalheim et al. 2002] photo with an inkjet printer, 2400 x 1200 dpi, hole in the pupil

▶ Iris pattern printed in contact lenses

▶ Artificial 3D irises


© Thalheim et al.




Attacks

Nixon et al. 2007


► Spoofs




Natural iris



Fake iris printed on a contact lens



2D Fourier spectrum of natural iris



2D Fourier spectrum of fake iris

Images of a real and fake iris and their associated Fourier spectrums




Detecting Iris Spoofing

- ▶ Detect involuntary eye movements (*hippus*), or reaction to light, blinking
- ▶ Challenges (blink, move sideways)




Detecting Iris Spoofing


► Fourier Analysis




Natural iris



Fake iris printed on a contact lens



2D Fourier spectrum of natural iris




2D Fourier spectrum of fake iris

Images of a real and fake iris and their associated Fourier spectrums [44].



Face



<http://media.salon.com/>

Spoof Creation

- ▶ **How does it work**
 - ▶ Take pictures under visible or infrared light
 - ▶ Matching uses different features
 - ▶ Can be 2D or 3D.
- ▶ **Spoofs**
 - ▶ Printed photos
 - ▶ Videos (notebook/cellphones)
 - ▶ 3D models

© Thalheim et al.



How to detect

- ▶ Involuntary movements of the eyes, head
- ▶ Blinking
- ▶ Skin texture, light reflection/refraction (active)



How to detect

- ▶ Light reflection 2D x 3D [Tan et al. 2010]
- ▶ Image Fourier Analysis
- ▶ 3D sensor
- ▶ Challenges (blinking, smiling, spelling)




Reflections



Reflections [Thalheim et al. 2002]

- ▶ Tested devices are not for high-security premises but
 - ▶ Cost x Benefit (how much does it cost to move to biometric authentication? Is it secure?)
 - ▶ Biometric devices are already able to fully replace passwords?





Apple Inc.

Multispectral Imaging in Fingerprints

[Nixon et al. 2007]



Sensor

- ▶ **Lumidigm** MSI – J110
- ▶ Setup to acquire surface and sub-surface of the finger with different optical conditions
- ▶ Subsurface **optical features** discriminate real and fake fingers
- ▶ The combinations allow for different conditions of acquiring fingerprints (physiological and environmental)
Strong lighting, humidity, poor finger contact with the sensor, dry skin




Spoof tests

- ▶ 3 sensors, 118 volunteers (18/80 yrs)
- ▶ 3-week visits (no special instruction to wash hands or prepare fingers)
- ▶ Total of **49 spoof types**: latex, silicon, play-doh, glue, resin, gelatin, etc.
- ▶ Total of 17,454 collected images from real fingers and 27,486 fake ones.



Spoof tests

- ▶ TPR: 99.5%
- ▶ False positives: 0.9%.
- ▶ MSI sensors reasonably robust



Face Spoofing Detection in Detail

[Pinto et al., 2012]



Some conclusions



Conclusions

- ▶ **Cat and mouse** / Arm's race
- ▶ More research (independent of manufactures) are important
- ▶ There are promising anti-spoofing devices such as the Lumidigm MSI for fingerprints and [Tan et al. 2010] and [Pinto et al. 2012] for faces. But a lot of more research is necessary.

References



Referências

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- **[Thalheim et al. 2002]** L. Thalheim, J. Krissler, P.-M. Ziegler; Body Check: Biometric Access Protection Devices and their Programs Put to the Test. Heise Online. November 2002
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- **[Li et al. 2004]** Jiangwei Li , Yunhong Wang , Tieniu Tan , A. K. Jain: Live face detection based on the analysis of Fourier spectra. In Biometric Technology for Human Identification (2004)
- **[Pinto et al. 2012]** PINTO, Allan da Silva; PEDRINI, Hélio; SCHWARTZ, William Robson; ROCHA, Anderson. Video-Based Face Spoofing Detection through Visual Rhythm Analysis In: Conference on Graphics, Patterns and Images (Sibgrapi), 2012, Ouro Preto, Brazil.



Obrigado!

Thank you!